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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

~tate
J. L. GIBSON,

of Utah
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

l?l,AH STATE TEACHERS' RETIRE- ·
BOARD, LEROY E. COvYLES, \
CHARLES H. SKIDMORE, JOSEPH ~
CHEZ, ALEX JEX, ~~[I L T 0 N B.
TAYLOR, D. A. vVO. OTTON, and J. R.
SMITH, Members Thereof,
Defendants.

2\IEN~r

I

Petition for Rehearing, and Support-

ing Brief
PETITION FOR REHEARING
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
ASSOCIATE .JUSTICES OF THE SUPREQVIE
COURT OF UTAH:
Come now the defendants in the above entitled cause
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Court
for of aMuseum
rehearLibrary Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

ing in such cause for the following reasons and
upon the following grounds:
1.

That the majority opinion is in error in holding
that the defendants contended that the word "contributes" should be construed as meaning "has contributed.''

...
0

That the majority opinion heretofore rendered is
in error by in effect holding that the language of
subdivision B of Section 12 of Chapter 85, Laws of
Utah, 1937, is uncertain and ambiguous and as such
requires construction or interpretation.

:t
That the majority opinion is in error in holding
that by the use of the word "contributes" the legislature intended to mean ''is contributing.''
4~

That the majority opinion heretofore rendered in
this cause is in error in not giving to the word ''contributes'' its natural and ordinary meaning and in
not giving it the same meaning that such word is
given in Section 21 of Chapter 85. Laws of Utah,
1937.

5.
That the majority opinion is in error by in effect
substituting in the act the words "is contributing''
for the word ''contributes.''
6.
That the majority opinion is in error in construing
ihe language used in subdivision "b'' of Section 12,
Chapter 85, Laws of Utah, 1937, to the effect that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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plajntiff is not permanently excluded from rnembership in the Utah State Teachers' Retirement
System.
\\IJlerefore, upon the grounds hereinbefore set torth,
the defendants in this proceeding pray that a rehearing and reconsideration of this cause should be had
and that the decision of the majority of this Court
should be revised and that this Court render a de~ision holding that the plaintiff herein is permanently disqualified from membership in the Utah State
Teachers' Retirement System and not entitled to
the benefits of an annuity contract under said
system.
Respectfully suomitted)
JOSEPH CHEZ,
GROVER A. GILES,
WM. A. HILTON.
Attorneys for Defendants.

Now comes Wm. A. Hilton and hereby certifies that
he is attorney for the defendants in the above entitled cause. That he has thoroughly examined the
opinions filed by the Justices in this cause, has considered the legal principles announced in the said
opinions, and that in his opinion there is good reason to pelieve, and he does believe that the judgment
and decision made by a majority of the members of
this Court is erroneous and that the cause o~u~ht to
be reexamined and recom~iclered by this Court.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23d day of
October, 1940.
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V\71\L A. HILTON.

Brief

tn

Support of Petition for
Rehearing

This brief in support of a petition for rehearing is
:filed on behalf of the defendants and also on behalf
10f the Utah Education Association which, by leave
of this Court, has permitted their counsel to join
herein as amicus curiae. It is the contention of the
defendants and the Utah Education Association>
first: That the language contained in the act here
brought in question is clear and unambiguous and
hence not subject to construction or interpretation, and, second: Even if it be conceded that the
act is subject to construction, still under well established rules of construction the act should be construed to exclude plaintiff from membership in the
Utah State Teachers' Retirement System.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE HERE
INVOLVED EXPRESSLY EXCLUDES THE
PLAINTIFF FROl\1: :MEMBERSHIP IN
THE TEACHERS' RETIREl\fENT SYSTE:M
AND THEREFORE THE OPINION OF A
~MAJORITY OF THIS COURT IS IN ERROR
IN INTERPOLATING ""\VORDS INTO THArr
STATUTE.
On the bottom of page two of the typewritten opinion, Mr. Justice Larsen s.ays:
''The argument resolves itself as to whether
the expression 'The State of Utah contributes part of the premium' (italics
added) is to be read as 'is contributing' or
as 'has
contributed'
part
ofby the
premium.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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Plaintiff contends for tht' fornwr construction and defendants contend for the latter
one.''
~-\.t

the outset the defendants disclain1 any intention of contending that the wo1 d '• contributes''
should be construed as meaning •· ha~ contributed.''
If there is any language in the brief heretofore filed
which conyeys the idea that defendants claim that
the words "has contributed'' should be substituted
for the word ''contributes,'' we wish to correct any
such impression conYeyed because in our view there
is no occasion and the law does not permit the interpolation of the word ''has'' into the act or construe
the word "contributes" as meaning "has contributed." It is a basic principle of law in this and
other jurisdictions that if a statute is plain, certain
and free from ambiguity, then and in such case the
courts must give effect to the meaning of the language used and may not resort to interpretation or
construction. Stated conversely, it is when, and
only when, a statute is ambiguous and its meaning uncertain that resort may be had to rules of
construction or interpretation in order to ascertain
what the legislature meant. Such has been the holding of this Court and courts in other jutisdictions
time and time again. A few of the many cases so
holding will serve to jllustrate the rule:
Holvering- v. St. Louis S. Ry. Co., 84 Fed.
(2d) 857.
People v. CnmmmYwealth of r:rrxas, ~)f) N. Y.
556.
F. ~. v. Hartw~n., 6 Wall ( U. S.) 395; 18
L. Rrl. 830.
U. S. v. ·wriltherger, 5 'Vheat (tT. S.) 76.
Ruggels v. Ill., 108 U. S. 526.
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney Law Library.,~.
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McCluskie v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 601.
Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507.
(;erfass v. State, 42 1\ild. 403.
Koch v. Bridge, 45 Miss. 247.
Water Commission v. Brewster, 42 N. J.
125.
Reese v. Judges of District Court of Salt
Lake County, 52 Utah 520; 175 P. 601.
Hanchett, et al v. Burbidge, et al, 59 Utah
127; 202 P. 377.
State e~ rel Gallacher v. Third Judicial
Dist. Ct., 36 Utah 68; 104 P. 750.
In re Schenk's Estate, 53 Utah 381; l'i8
P. 344.
Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55; 65 P. 534.
State v. Davis, 55 Utah 54; 184 P. 161.
That such is the law is fundamental in our system
o:f government. If the courts are permitted to
ignore the expressed intention of the legislature,
such action on the part of the courts constitutes an
invasion of the provisions of the legislature and violates the tri-parted theory of our government. If
that is permitted the legislature becomes a nonentity
and the courts actually make the law. In order to
keep the judicial branch of government from invading the province of the legislature the courts resort to construction· only when it is necessary to
ascertain the legislative intent, and even where a
statute is ambiguous, considerable caution should
he exercised by the court lest its opinion be sub·
stituted for the intention of the legislature.
Attorney General v. Parsell, 100 Mich. 170;
58 N. W. 839.
Roberts v. Cannon, 20 N. C. 398.
The Iangua,ge of subdivision "b" of Section 12,
Chapter 85, LR\VS of Utah, 1937, i~ plain, certain and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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free from ambiguity. It is there provided that ''the
following teachers shall be excluded fron1 1nen1ber~
f,hip in the -retirement system.''
"{b) Every teacher who is the holder of
a retirement annuity contract with the
'_1\~achers' Insurance & Annuity Association
of America, or with any other private or~
ganization or c01npany in which the State
of Utah, or any subdivision thereof, contributes part of the pren1ium under svid contract, provided however_ that every such
teacher upon ceasing to be a holder of such
contract ~nd being o'therwise eli~ble t0
membership in this system shall forthwith
1:ecome a member of this system.''
As we read the opinion in the light of the admitted
facts, the members of this Court are all agreed that
plaintiff is the holder of a retirement annuity contract with the Teachers' Insurance & A.nnuity Association of America. As to that being so the:ce
can be no doubt. The mere fact that plaintiff has
ceased to pay premiums. and that the University of
Utah has, upon the request of plaintiff, ceased to
pay part of the premium on plaintiff's contract,
does not change the nature of the contract. Such
failure to pay premiums has merely the p,ffect of
reducing the amount of annuity to which plaintiff
will be entitled upon r2tirement. It does not alter
the fact that he is the holder of a retirement contntct. Plaintiff makes no claim tn the contrary
nor is there any controversy about the fact that the
contributions made hy the University of Utah as a
part of the premiums on M.r. Gibson's contract was
Sponsored by
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the State
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of its subdivisions. According to the prevailing
opinion of this Court the word ''contributes'' as
used in the phrase ''in which the State of Utah or
any subdivision thereof contributes part of the
premium under said contract" is so uncertain or
ambiguous as to permit of interpretation or construction, and that the word ''contributes'' should
be construed as meaning ''is contributing.'' We
most earnestly urge that the word "contributes"
may not be distorted into meaning "is contributing.''
R. S. U. 1933, 88-2-11, provides that :
''Words. and phras.es are to be construed
according to the context and the approved
usage of the language; but technical words
and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are
to be construed according to such peculiar
and appropriate meaning or definition.''
R. S. U. 1933, 88-2-12, provides that:
''In the construction of these statutes the
following rules shall be observed, unless
such construction would be inconsistent
with the manifest intent of the legislature
or repu~ant to the context of the statute.''
R. S. U. 1933~ 88-2-12, Subdivision (8)
provides:

''Words used in the present tense include
t?u? future.''
When viewed in the light of the provisions of the
statutes just quoted and the generally accepted
rules of construction and interpretation of statutes,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the language just quoted is as clear and certain as
it can be made. ~Ir. Gibson was the holder of aretirement annuity contract in which the University
of Utah contributed part of the prenriums after the
act took effect. 11he act provides that it shall take
elfect upon approval. It was approved on March
23, 1937. The University of Utah continued to pay
a part of the premiums until December of 1937.
Admittedly plaintiff's status as the holder of the
contract did not terminate when he ceased to make
payments on his contract and requested the University to do likewise.
'\Yhile the verb ''contributes'' is in the present tense,
it, under the provisions of
R: S. U. 1933, 88-2-12, Subdivision 8,
also means any contract upon which the University
of Utah shall contribute a part of the pre1niums at
any future time. That is, at any time after the act
took effect. If the legislature had n1eant what the
majority opinion indicates, it would have been very
easy for it to have provided that teachers should
he excluded from membership in the retirement
system only during the time that the State of Utah
or one of its ~ubdivisions was contributing a part
of the premium on a retirement annuity contract
held by such teacher; but it did not ao that. If the
legislature had intended that the word '' contributes'' means ''is contributing'' it mm:;t hr- assnmecl
that it would hm'<' 11sed that languag-r.
Moreover, if the words ''is contributing'' should be
substituted for the word "contributes" thB statute
would be rendered ambiguous and uncertain. If
tl10 phrase in which the State of Utah or any sub~
Sponsored by
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premiums should be substituted for the language
actually used, the question might then atise as to
the time that is meant by the words '• is contributing." It may be argued with considerable logic
that the substituted words may mean at the timr·
the act took effect, or at some future time when
the _State of Utah or one of its subdivisions should
cease paying a part of the premiums. If the word~·
"is contributing" are substituted in the act forth,
word ''contributes'' there may he room for inter
pretation or construction, but obviously a crJurt may
not by construction or interpretation create an un
certainty or ambiguity in a statute, otherwise clear
and certain,, and then proceed to construe the statute thus rendered ambiguous and uncertain. Under
the act as it is the word ''contributes'' me am~ at
the present time, which under the provisions of
R. S. U. 1933, 88-2-12, Subdivision 8,

also means at any tim~ in the future. In light of
the fact, as appears without dispute, that the University of Utah did contribute a part of thr. premiums on Mr. Gibson's contract afte1· the act took
effect, the language used clearly excludes 2.T r. Gib
son from the right to membership in the State rc·
tirement system. Nor does the provision thai
''every such teacher upon ceasing to be a holder o:
such contract and being otherwise eligible to mem~
bership in this system shall forthwith become a
me1nber of the syste~~' aid Mr. Gibson. He at all
times Rince the act was passed and at the present
time is the holder of such a contract. If the legislature had intended what the prevailing opinion in
effect says it intended, it would have been a simple
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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matter to have provided that when a teacher ceased
to pay premiums on an annuity contract such
teacher becomes a member of the system. It must
be assumed that the legislature was fan1iliar with the
fact that some of the teachers of Utah held contracts
such as that held by the plaintiff; that such P-OD·
tracts were not assignable, and also that even
though perchance some teachers should temporarily or permanently cease to pay premiums on their
annuity contracts, the contract would still be in
effect and entitle the holder thereof to an annuity.
To hold otherwise is to assume that the legislature
was either ignorant of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the subject matter of the legislature
or that it did not mean what it clearly expressed in
the language used. In this eonnection it should be
observed that this Court is not concerned with the
wisdom or the lack of wisdom of the legislature
in enacting the law in the form that it was enacted.
That is a matter solely within the province of the
law-making power, in the apsence of Constitutional
objections.
Sol. Block & Griff v. Schwartz, 27 Utat
387; 76 P. 22.
Rtate, ex rel Breeden v. Lewis, 26 Utah 120;
72 P. 338.
Na~h v. Clark~ ~7 Utah 158; 75 P. 371.
Trihune Reporter Pub.· Co. v. :Homer, 51
Utah 153; 169 P. 170.
.
Salt Lake Countv v. Salt Lake City, 42
Utah 548; 134 P. 560.
Rio G1:ande Lumber Co. v. Earle, 50 Utah
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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ASSU~IING

THAT THE LANGUAGE 0]-, SECTION 12 OF· CHAPTER 85, LAWS OF UTAH,
1937, IS SO UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS
AS TO PER~1IT OF OR REQUIRE CONSTRUCTION, STILL A CONSTRUCTION
SHOULD BE GIVEN EXCLUDING PLAINTIFF FROJ\1 MEMBERSHIP IN THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM.
We are mindful that when the language of a statute
is ambiguous or uncerfain. the courts resort to established rules of construction for the purpose of
ascertaining the legislative intent. In the quest for
ascertaining such intent resort may he had not only
to the language used in the act, but also to the purpose or reason why the particular law was passed
by the legislature. In seeking to ascertain the legislative purpose the courts will resort to intrinsic
evidence bearing on intent, that is, evidence found
within the act; also to extrinsic evidence, such as
evidence touching the circumstances existing at the
time the law was enacted, the necessity for the law,
the evils intended to be cured by it, the law prior
to the enactment, and the consequences of adopting the construction urged.
In the prevailing opinion it is said that
"if defendants are correct in their interpretation any teacher who has ever, while
teaching in the State of Utah, been the
holder of such an annuity contract could
never become a member of the retirement
svstem. This follows of necessity since,
n~nder the terms of the contract, the holder
thereof can never divest himself of the paid
up deferred annuity ba~ed upon the amount
1H' had paid, except hy retirement from
teachjng and using it up a.s r6tirement henSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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efits, which disqualifie-s hin1 for men1bership in the system.''
It is true that the plaintiff herein under the
contract which he holds may not divest himself of
being the holder of that contract unless for some
reason the contract becomes a nullity, or it is so
changed as to make it assignable. At all events
the contract held by the plaintiff is of his own
choosing. However, it does not follow that the holders of other annuity contracts may not become
divested of any rig-ht in such contract because of
failure to comply "·it.h the contract or for oiher rea~ons that may be provided for in the contract. It
will be observed that thei statute covers not
rmly such contracts as that held by the plaintiff, but
by ''any other private organization or company in
which the State of Utah or any subdivision thereof
contributes a part of the premium.'' But it is
proper to inquire why should the plaintiff or any
teacher who continues to hold an annuity contract
be permitted to abandon a contract in which the
Stat~ of Utah or a subdivision thereof has paid a
part of the premium.
There are very good reasons why the holder of such
a contract should not be permitted to abandon the
same and shift over to another contract where the
State is likewise required to pay part of the premiums. It is self-evident that "when in 1905 Andrew Carnegie establiBhed a trust fund of ten million dollars as a foundation for the advancement of
teachers to be administered for retirement aHowances to teachers in universities, collegef1 and technical schools'' such fund was intended for and calculated as an aid to such teachers as were qualified
to partake of its benefits. It is also evident tha't
when the University of Utah consented to pay a
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of Utah, through its University, in effect acquired
an interest in that contract. rl1hat is to t:lay, if tho
plaintiff it; perrnitted to abandon that contract and
shift into the State retirement system, any and alJ
future benefits that Mr. Gibson may acquire by
reason of the endowment will be lost, and the
amount so lost must be borne either by Mr. Gibson
or the other teachers of the State, unless perchance
the legislature makes up the amount of such loss
by additional appropriations.
If, as Mr. Gibson apparently believes, he will g-et
more by becoming a member of the State system
than he will by continuing to pay the premiums on
his present contract the additional amount that
' and also the loss incurred
~fr. Gib·son 'Will receive
hy abandoning his present contract must be borne
hy either his fellow teachers or by the taxpayers
of the State, or both the other teachers and the taxpayers. To conclude that the legislatun~ of Utnh
by the act here brought in question intended to
~~hift to the people of Utah, discouraging· the holders of contracts from accepting the benefits that
will be derived from private trust funds, such as
the Carnegie Foundation Fnnd, on to the taxpayers
of Utah i; contrarv to all hu1nan experience; lf indeed such conclusi~n does not cast suspicion on the
intelligence and integrity of the law-making power.
Obviously, if there be a trus,t fund in whic~ teachers may participat?, the legislature, in the mterest
of the State, would be expected to do all within its
power to see that the teachers take advantage ?f
the benefits derived from such trust fund, or, 1f,
as in the case of plaintiff, they had received Rome
of the benefits of such a trust fund the legislature
doubtless would enact such laws as will require or
encourao-e them to continue to accept the benefits
th~Lawtrust
fundfor digitization
ratherprovided
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burdens on the people of Utah. It is self-evident
that if Mr. Gibson and other te~chers sirnilarly situated shall abandon such contra.cts as tha.t now held
by :Mr. Gibson and becmne n1embers of the State
Teachers' Retirement System, any benefits that
such teachers will be entitled to from the Carnegie
Foundation Fund will~ lost to someone within the
State of Utah. If not to ~Ir. Gibson, then to his
fellow teachers or the people of the State.
In this coimection it may be of aid to look at the
history ol. this State touching the establishment of
retirement funds. ·. It will be observed from the prevailing opinion that the Carnegie· Foundation Fund
was not. availa}~le .·to any teachers other than thos.e
in universities, colleges and technical schools. So
far as we are advised no such private trust fund
has ever been established in Utah· for retirement
allowances to teachers in our common and high
Fchools. Prior to the enactment of
Chapter 85, Laws of Utah, 1937,
. the Board of Education in Salt Lake, Ogden and
Provo made provisions for the teachers within said
cities to avail themselves of a growing demand to
provide a retirement fund for such teachers. It
was only in those cities where, at the time the act
of 1937 was passed, the benefits of retirement contracts were available to teachers in our common and
high schools. The lnc.:l.l system defined in·
Subdivision 24, Seetion 1 of Chapter 85,
Laws of Utah, 1937,
refers to the plan ·whereby the teachers in the schoo]R
of Salt Lake., Ogden ,and Provo cou]d secure the
benefits of a retirement allowance, annuity or penRion as defined in the act. The act here brought in
question
enacted
teachers
Sponsored· by
the S.J. Quinneywas
Law Library.
Funding for primarily
digitization providedto
by theenable
Institute of Museum
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
who could not participate in any retirement plan to
do s.o.
That the legislature attempted to make the cost of
this plan to the people of Utah as low as could be,
may reasonably be assumed. It is also reasonable
to assume that the legislature knew that a substantial trust fund had already been created by Mr.
Carnegie and that possibly other such funds would
be created for a like purpose. So also is it apparJ
ent that the legislature knew that the boards of education of the cities of Salt Lake, Ogden and Provo
had provided for a plan whereby the teachers of
those cities could avail themselves of the retirement benefits to be paid for in part by public funds.
In order to accomplish the purposes intended by the
act, the legislature wishes to discourage, and, so
far as possible, prohibit teachers who held contracts
with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity AssoCiation of America, and other private organizations
or companies, from ceasing to carry out any con·
tracts which they might hold where the State of
Utah or any subdivisions thereof contributed; hence
the exclusion provided for in subdivision "b'• of
Section 12 of those teachers who were participating
and may continue to participate in the benefits of
private trust funds.
By subdivision '' d'' teachers ''"110 were members of
local systems were excluded from the act unless, on
or before December 31, 1937, they, by a written document, elected to become members of the State retirement system. Unlike the teachers who held contracts which entitled them to participate in private
endowment funds, as contemplated by subdivision
"b " the teachers who fell under subdivision "d''
' not participating in any private endowment
were
fund but were. under theh· contracts. entitled to
participate
in the
public
funds
created
hyof Museum
boards
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education in the cities n1entioned. There was thus
no controlling reason why the teachers under the
local system should not be pern1itted to shift to the
State system because in either event the contributions made to their contract came from publio
funds.
If the teacher remained a 1nember of the local system the school boards contributed towards the fund,
whereas if they becan1e members of the State sys~
tern the State contributed to the fund. Not so however with those teachers who fell under subdivision
•'b'' of Section 12 of the act. As to those teachers,
if they abandoned their contract it resulted in shifting the burden carried by the foundation fund on to
the public fnnds of the State of Utah. Hence the
provision that so long as they remained the holde1
of the contract in which the State of Utah or one of
its s~bdivisions contributes a part of the premium
they may not shift to the State system. !1oreover,
if a teacher in the same class as the plaintiff once
establishes his eligibility for membership in the
Utah State Teachers' Retirement System there is
no provision in the act whereby his eligibility shall
terminate if he shall later decide to reinstate the
contract upon which the University of Utah has paid
a part of the premiums. If the construction placed
upon the act by the prevailing opinion is adhered to
plaintiff "Will receive the benefits from two retirement funds in which the State of Utah has
contributed.
That the law-makin<.; power did not intenrl to thu~
bestow upon teachers the premiums paid in part
with public funds on two retirement contracts,
while denying the same privilege to other teachers,
would seem self-evident. More as to that: If tha
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opinion the plaintiff and other teachers similarly
situated may continue to indefinitely shift their
po~ition by being entitled to membership in the State
~reachers' Retirement ~ystem for one month or
more, and. then upon ~ dtange of mind return to the
Teachers' Annuity & Insurance Association of
America or some other private organization. The
language used in the act clearly indicates that the
legislature intended to prevent such confusion and
favoritism.
s~ction

13 of the act prm,jdes that ''any contributing member of a local system who is excluded
from membership herein by the provisions of subdivision '' d'' of Section 12, and who is otherwise
eligible for such memb.ership may elec1 to become
a member of the retirement system by a written
document duly executed and filed with the retirement board on or before December 31, 1937." Tt
is not claimed that plaintiff was or is a member of
any local system. The act defines a local system aR
''any public teachers' r8tirffinen_t association orJ
ganized and operated for the retirement of teachers
of any public school under the provisions of any
laws of this State.'' Thus the act expressly excludes teachers from membership in the State re·
tirement svstem who are contrihuting- members of
a local sy~tem; provided that they 'i:nay transfer
their membership to the State teachers' retirement
system in the event the teacher elects to become a
l';f'mlwr of thP ~vp,tpm ~.;;: h-.-." the act nrovided. But
as to teachers who hold contractR within the Teach·
ers' Insurance & Annuity Association of America
or with any other private organization or com-pany
in which the State of Utah or any subdivh:ion thereof contributes part of the premium, the election is,
under the plain languag-e of the act, at all eventR
made
as Law
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its subdiYisions ''contribute'' a part of the premium
under the contract.

On pag~ three of the typewritten prevailing opinion
it is said:
'• This construction is further evid~nced by
Section 21, dealing with 'termination of
m~mbership, - withdrawals and deposits,'
and providing that a member who discontinues a status requisite to membership,
except by death or retirement, may withdraw from the fund his accumulafed contributions. He may again become a member
with his old standing and rating upon acquiring a teaching status for membership
and redepositing in the fund the amount of
his ·withdrawals.''
The language of Section 21 tou('hing withdrawals
and redeposits of necessity applies only to teachers
who occupy the status requisite to membership in
the State retirement system. Obviously, if plaintiff if ineligible to membership in the State retirement system because he is the holder of a contract
with the Teachers' Insurance & Annuity .A.ssocia·
tion of America in which the University of Utah,
nfter th r D ·.' fnnk rf:rp,"f. · rn11trilntfPrl c~ part of the
premium} he could not occupy the status of membership in the State retirement syRtem. If plain~
tiff has not deposited any money in the State J:etirement fund prr.Yidrd for in t11e act the1·e is no
money for him to withdraw. That the provisions
of the act with respect to withdrawa 1~ and redepm.:its do not ancl eannot apply to mone~~ paid by
the plaintiff as premiums on his contract with the
Teachers' Insnrance & Annuity Association of
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deals only with the State fund, and the further fact
that the fund in the Teachers' Insunmce & Annu.
ity Association of America is beyond the control of
the legislature.
Attention is also called in the prevailing opinion to
this language found in Section 21 of the act:
' 'For the purpose of this section, the holder
of a retirement annuity contract with the
Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association
of America or with any other private organization or company, in which the State
of Utah or any subdivision thereof contributes part of the premium under saia contract, shall be considered permanent separation from service in status requisite to
rnembership herein.''
Commenting upon the provisions last quoted it is
said in the prevailing opinion that:
"It then provides that for the purpose of
Section 21 only, that is, of terminating a
membership which is in existence and allowing withdrawals of accumulated contribubutions, the holding of a contract with a
private retirement pension company, for
which the State is contributing part of the
premium, shall be considered terminating
the status of membership. . . . "
We most earnestly submit that the construction
placed upon the langua.ge last quoted from the pre·
vailing opinion does violence to the clear meaning
of the language of the act. It will be noted that the
prevailing opinion interpolates the word ''only."
If the language just quoted from the act is given
effect
according to its clear meaning, namely, that
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the holder of a contract such as that held by plaintiff is permanently separated from the State retirement system, he is precluded from Inmubership
in the State systenl and therefore precluded from
making payments to the State fund. If no payments
may be made there is nothing to withdraw and
nothing to redeposit. So, likewise, if a holder of
a contract such as that held by plaintiff·" shall be
considered permanent separation from service in
the status requisite to membership in the system''
as the legislature has prescribed, he, of necessity,
is excluded from membership in the State retire . .
ment system as provided in subdivision "b" of
Section 12 of the act. To say that a teacher shal1
be permanently separated from the system and at
the same time be a member of that system presents
an impossible situation.

It is reasonable to assume that in the light of the
language found in subsection "b" of Section 12 it
was not necessary to repeat the same thought in
Section 21, but the legislature wished to make it
clear and certain that the holder of a contract such
as that held by plaintiff should be excluded from
membership in the system and of the right to make
payment~, withdrawals and redeposits in the fund
set up solely for members of the State system; and
hence the provisions of Section 21 that the holders
of such contracts as that held by :ola.intiff, shall,
for the purpose of membership, payment, with~
drawal and redeposits "be considered permanent
Reparation from service in status requisHe to membership in the systrm." If the plaintiff must, becausf\ of being a holder of the contract he holds, "be
considered permanent separation" from the system,
he could not withdraw his membership from a sysSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1nay not withdraw or redeposit money from a fund
to which he has not contributed.
In this connection the Court's attention is directed
to the well established rule of construction that the
provisions of a statute must, whenever possible, be
harmonized and not be so construed that one provision is at war with another.
University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah
457; 59 P. 96.
Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28; 95 P. 520.
N elden v. Clark, 20 Utah 3H2; 59 P. 524.
Buckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co.,
61 Utah 559; 216 P. 684.
State v. Pay, 45 Utah 511; 146 P. 300.
Board of Education of Ogden v. Hunter, 48
Utah 373: 159 P. 1019.
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Com.
57 Utah 208; 193 P. 821.
Forsyth v. Selma Min. Co., 58 Utah 142;
197 P. 586.
It is further said in the prevailing opinion that:
''This is further made clear hy the provisions with respect to teachers holding
membership in local rP-tirement systems.
Rnch teachers can only draw from the State
fund a pension or retirement benefit in proportion to what his contributions to the
State fund bear to what he would have paid
had he not belonged to the local system,
·where a subdivision of the State pays into
the local fund, but. such deduction shall
rn,lv "hf:\ made for the time such teacher was
n member of both systems.''
The langua.ge referred to in that part of the opinion
just
quoted
applies
to membership
local
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tirement systen1s which are under the control of the
State legislature and the boards of education of
the schools wherein such systems have been established. There is no private fund in the local systems. The provisions referred to cannot possibly
affect the Teachers t Insurance & .Annuity Association of America or any other like org~anization. It
is thus difficult to see how the provisions with respect to local systems can be of any aid in construing the language dealing with such contracts as that
held by the plaintiff herein.
It is said in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe on the bottom of page four of the typewritten copy that:
"I fear the ruling in the main o!pinion
courts disaster for these reserves or at
least tends towards that result.''
Further on in the opinion beginning at the end of
the first line of paragraph 1 on page five of the
dissenting opinion, it is said:

''It may very well be that the legislature had
before it the number of men connected with
the University of Utah and the Agricultural
College who had contracts with the association and had data in respect to each of such
cont.rar,t holders.''
On page six of the dissenting opinion Mr. Justice
Wolfe points out the burden that would be cast
upon the State in the event there were twenty teachers in the universities in the same or a similar situation as is the plaintiff, with an average :-;ervice of
twenty years, it would cost Fourteen Thousand Two
Hundred Eighty ($14,280) Dollars per year to pay
retirement benefits and if they live twenty years
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benefits the sum of Two Hundred Eighty-five
Six Hundred ( $285,600) Dollar::;. It is
indic:ated that the illustration may underestimate
or overestimate the real situation, but that it gives
the reader some idea of what the legislature sought
to avoid, etc.

~Thousand

While the courts are not in entire accord as to what
evidence or information they may resort to in order
to ascertain the legislative purpose, the better reasoned rases take the view that courts are not shut
off from the discussion and sources of information
that were available to the legislature that may shed
light on the purpose sought to be accomplished by
an enactment.
West et al v. Sun Cab Co., (Md.), 154 Atl
100.

If the facts that were available and presumably
known to the legislature at the time of the passage
of the law here brought in question were judicially
known to this Court, the fear entertained by Mr.
Justice Wolfe would be more than justified and it
would be made clear that the strain on the State
fund would be very much greater than the amount
used in the illustration by Associate Justice ·Wolfe.
While there may be some doubt as to how this Court
1nay judicially know the true state of facts tha.t were
available to the legislature at the time the act was
passed, such information should, in our view, be
1nade available to this Court before the prevailing
.opinion becomes the settle11aw in this ;jurisdiction.
That it would be a very material aid to this Court
in determining the legislative purpose and intent in
passing the act here in question if it had before it
the facts tha.t were available to the legislature when
the act was passed, cannot admit of doubt. That
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the Court may inform itself a8 to such circmnstances
by any and all available n1ean8, finds support in
the adjudicated cases.
Schultz v. Ohio County, :226 Ky. 633; 11
S. \Y. (2d) 702.
Cousins v. 8overeign Can1p, (Texas), 35
S. \Y. (2d) 696
Higgins v. Rinker, -17 Tex. :~93; 39 HalT.
L. Rev. 122.
West Boylston Mfg. Co. v. ·Bvard of Asses~
sors, 277 ~lass. 180; 178 N. E. 531.
That evidence may be introduced when a statute is
uncertain and hence requires construction for thA
purpose of shedding light on the legislative purpose and hence legislative intent, finds support in
both textbooks and adjudicated cases. A very recent work containing a discussion of citations of
authority of this matte~ will be found in
Statutory Construction (1940 Edition), by
Crawford, Chapter XXI, beginning on
Page 36;).
A resort to the information available to the lf>:gislature when the act here brought in question was
passed will show, among other pertinent facts, the
following: That in excess of two hundred (200)
teachers and agents were in the employ of the University of Utah and the Agricultural College who
had contracts \Yith the Teachers' Insurance & Annnit~r Association; that if these teachers and agents.
should become member~ of the Statr> system without deduction because of their havin!! heen members of the Teachers' Insurance & An~;n_ty Associa_
tion, it would require about One Hundred Forty
Thousand ($140,000) Dollars a year, or, if they lived
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of Two Million ( $2,000,000) Dollars to take care of
retirement benefits. If a reduction is made because
of teachers having been members of the association
the cost of such retirement benefits would probably
amount to Eighty-seven Thousand ($87,000) Dollars per year, or if the teachers lived an average of
fifteen years after retirement, the probable total
cost would be One Million Three Hundred Ten
Thousand ($1,310,000) Dollars.
It should be observed that in referring to agents,
s01ne of the faculty of the Agricultural College who
were engaged in experimental work are eligible for
and do hold contracts with the Teachers' Insurance
& Annuity Association. It will thus be seen that if
the majority opinion is to stand it may well beth~
death knell of the retirement system. If this Court
~hould conclude that the foregoing facts are a.
proper subject matter of inquiry in this case (and
we believe them to be) we most earnestly urge that
a rehearing be granted so that this Court may
properly be advised with respect thereto.
An examination of the entire act here brought in
question shows that while teachers in local systems
may become members of the State system, they may
not receive the benefits of members in both systems.
No such provision is made with respect to thosP.
teachers who hold contracts with the Teachers' Insurance "& Annuity Association, or other private
organizations or companies to which the State sys·
tern or a subdivision thereof pays a part of the premium. Membership in the State ~ystem carries
with it benefits which all members thereof are eniitled to participate in without any provision whatsoever for a deduction because of a teacher being or
having been the holder of a contract with the Teachers' insurance & Annuity Associatio11. A definit.P-
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time is fixed by the act for n1embers of a local sys-

0

0

tem to become transferred to the State system.
There is no such provision with respect to the holder
of a contract with the Teachers Insurance & Annuity
Association. All of these facts point unerringly to
the conclusion that the act was intended to exclude
holders of contracts with the rreachers' Insurance
& Annuity Association from membership in the
State system.
If the construction placed upon the act by the nlajority opinion is to prevail there is no language whatsoever in the act which precludes the plaintiff and
::>ther holders of similar contracts from retaining
all the benefits of a contract with the ~Peachers' Insurance & Annuity Association and also all of thP
benefits of the State system. Such result offends
against fair and equal dealing towards all teachers.
In the light of the fact that the act was passed primarily to assist those teachers who were unable to
secure the benefits of a retirement fund at the time
the act was passed} it would indeed be a grave injustice to such teachers if other teachers in universities, colleges and technical schools, already taken
care of by contracts to which the State has contributed a part of the premium, should be vermitted
to keep what they have without any deductions
whatsoever and in addition thereto participate
equally with other teachers who have not been so
favored in a State fund, with the probable result
that such fund will be destroyed, and with the certainty that it will h0 seriously impa.i.red.

We earnestly urge that the language of the act
clearly precludes such results and even if the language be regarded as uncertain or ambiguous the
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tion of statutes require that such a result was a
is contrary to the legislative intent.
This proceeding is of vital concern to the teache
and people generally of the State of Utah and 1
earnestly urge that a rehearing should be grant~
to the end that this cause he reexamined and th
the statute be held to exclude plaintiff from mez
bership in the State system.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney General of Utah.
GROVER A. GILES,
Asst. Attorney General of
Utah.
IDI. A. HILTON, Special Counsel.
ELIAS HANSEN,
Appearing as Amicus Curiae
and on Behalf of Utah
Education Association.
Attorneys for Defendant
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